Suchergebnisse

Intro; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; 1. Introduction; 2. Region and regionalism in the immediate postwar period; 3. Decolonisation and Commonwealth responsibility; 4. The Cold War and non-communist solidarity in East Asia; 5. The winds of change; 6. Outside the margins; 7. Conclusion; References; Index

Australia's engagement with Asia from 1944 until the late 1960s was based on a sense of responsibility to the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian colonies as they navigated a turbulent independence into the British Commonwealth. The circumstances of the early Cold War decades also provided for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non‑communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships. From 1967 into the early 1970s, however, Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity demonstrates that the framework for this deep Australian engagement with its region was progressively eroded by a series of compounding, external factors: the 1967 formation of ASEAN and its consolidation by the mid-1970s as the premier regional organisation surpassing the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; Washington's de‑escalation and gradual withdrawal from Vietnam after March 1968; the 1969 Nixon doctrine that America's Asia-Pacific allies must take up more of the burden of providing for their own security; and US rapprochement with China in 1972. The book shows that these profound changes marked the start of Australia's political distancing from the region during the 1970s despite the intentions, efforts and policies of governments from Whitlam onwards to foster deeper engagement. By 1974, Australia had been pushed to the margins of the region, with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.

This article challenges the position that genuine and substantive Australian engagement with Asia began only in the 1980s during the final phase of the Cold War. In reality, the deepest points of Australia's political and security engagement occurred much earlier, from 1950 to 1971, with the most intense phase from 1966 to 1968. The Cold War instilled a sense of solidarity with the non-Communist states of East Asia, with which Australia fostered and mostly enjoyed close relationships. These relationships were grounded in shared values and a non-Communist identity that transcended the narrow security interest of Australia's "forward defence" strategy. The conditions for this solidarity were eroded from 1967 to 1972 by a series of compounding factors that transformed Cold War geopolitics in East Asia. By 1974, Australia had been politically distanced from the region with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.

This article challenges both the "gentlemanly capitalist" thesis and "official mind" interpretation of the 1882 British occupation of Egypt. The former fails to adequately consider the political character of the Anglo‐French financial Control overturned by the Urabist revolt in February 1882. The latter overstates the significance of the Suez Canal as both trigger and justification for military intervention. The article argues that the primary motivation behind the Egyptian occupation was the vindication of British prestige, vis‐à‐vis the Continental Powers, but especially in India and in the "East" by suppressing the threat to "civilised" order posed by the Urabist revolt. The protection of the Suez Canal and British financial and trade interests were secondary and derivative.